provides the prohibition of monopoly agreements, the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position, and merger control. Additionally, there is also a prohibition of administrative monopoly in chapter 5, since the most serious restrictions to competition in China come from governments themselves. From the perspective of substantive law, in this article I
give a brief overview of only the three pillars. In the last section, I discuss the challenges of enforcing the Law.
I. THE THREE PILLARS OF CHINA'S ANTIMONOPOLY LAW

A. The Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements
The first task of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law is to prevent monopoly agreements. Based on the experience of German law, the Chinese AML separates horizontal agreements from vertical agreements. Article 13 lists the following monopoly agreements between competitors as prohibited: * The author is Professor of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The author was honored to lecture on antitrust law twice for the Standing Committee of the 9 th and 10 th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. (ii) restricting minimum resale prices; and (iii) other monopoly agreements determined by the Antimonopoly Authority.
Like Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, Article 15 of the Chinese AML contains a series of exceptions from the prohibitions for both horizontal and vertical agreements.
The exempted agreements are those that involve: (i) technology improvement, or research and development of new products;
(ii) upgrading product quality, reducing costs, and improving efficiency, unifying product specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labor distribution; (iii) improving operational efficiency and enhancing the competitiveness of small-and medium-sized enterprises; (iv) achieving such public interests as energy saving, environmental protection, disaster relief, and so forth; According to paragraph 2 of Article 15, in the case of (i) to (v) mentioned above, the respondents must prove that the agreement will not substantially restrict competition, and that consumers will share the benefits derived from such agreements.
Surely there are some problems with the exemptions above. For example, Chinese exporting companies have been the target of at least two antitrust suits in the United States, and thus the exemption for exporting cartels may not provide Chinese exporting companies any real legal protection.
B. Prohibition of the Abuse of a Dominant Position
Chapter 3 In view of the fact that the market structure plays a key role in influencing the market behaviors of business operators, 3 Article 19 contains three presumptions with regard to whether a business operator has a dominant position based entirely on market share thresholds:
(i) the market share of one business operator accounts for one-half or more of the market;
(ii) the combined market share of two business operators accounts for twothirds or more; and (iii) the combined market share of three business operators accounts for threefourths or more.
Obviously, the source of these presumptions can be traced to the German Act against
Restraints of Competition. As is the case under German law, these presumptions may be rebutted.
C. Mergers and Acquisitions
Article 20 defines concentrations as:
(ii) acquisitions of control over another business operator by acquiring their voting shares or assets to an adequate extent; or It does not mean that the Antimonopoly Authority implements both competition policy and national security policy.
II. THE MAIN CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING THE CHINESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
In light of the current Chinese competition climate and the existing legal system and environment, the enforcement of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law will face some challenges in its earlier years.
I think the first challenge for the enforcement is the lack of an independent enforcement authority. According to Article 10, the Antimonopoly Law Enforcement
Agency under the State Council shall be responsible for the AML enforcement work.
However, it is not clear which agency will serve as the Antimonopoly Authority responsible for enforcing the AML. As it currently stands, three enforcement agencies, If there are relevant laws and administrative regulations stipulating that the monopolistic conducts prohibited by this Law shall be investigated and handled by the relevant departments or supervisory organs, the laws and regulations are to be applied. Where any administrative agency or organization empowered by laws or regulations with responsibilities for public affairs administration engages in conducts that eliminate or restrict competition in abuse of their administrative powers, its superior agency shall order it to make correction.
In my opinion, there are at least two reasons why the governmental agencies at the highest level may find it difficult to supervise and inspect the administrative restrictions created by the governmental organizations at a lower level. First, any administrative restriction on competition usually reflects treatment in favor of local, government-owned businesses or large State-owned enterprises. This situation makes it difficult for a higher agency to keep a neutral attitude in a dispute with a lower agency and the non-State owned enterprises or competitors from another region. Second, the socalled "higher agency" could be any agency, and in this situation, it is not likely that the higher agency would have an experienced understanding of competition law or policy.
Of course, there are also the challenges facing any new Law that has just been adopted including the need for more detailed provision or guidelines in the areas of horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, abuse of a dominant position, licensing and intellectual property rights, and many more.
